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1. INTRODUCTION 
Inflation is politically costly for the government (Haque and 
Qayyum, 2006). High and persistent inflation is a regressive tax which 
adversely impacts the poor (Baily, 1956, and Fisher and Modigliani, 
1978a, 1978b). The poor are extremely limited in their options to protect 
themselves against inflation; they are normally asset-poor, while most of 
their saving is in the form of cash. Inflation erodes cash savings and 
protects the rich who hold real assets (Fisher and Modigliani, 1978a). 
Given the well-known costs of inflation, policy now in all countries is 
inflation-averse. Studies have also found that high and volatile inflation 
has been detrimental to growth and financial sector development. 
Resource allocation is inhibited as inflation obscures relative price 
changes and thus inhibits optimal resource allocation. 
Knowledge about the factors that drive inflation is important to 
formulate appropriate policy to control inflation. Unquestionably, 
empirical evidence points to “inflation being always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon” [Friedman (1963)]. However, there still remains 
some debate on whether supply-side factors could cause inflation without 
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monetary accommodation (Bernanke, 2005).  The structuralist school of 
thought holds that supply constraints drive up prices of specific goods and 
have wider repercussions on the overall price level. Similarly, there are a 
number of possible sources of rising costs such as wages, profits, imported 
inflation, exchange rate, commodity prices, external shocks, exhaustion of 
natural resources, and taxes. For example, in Pakistan, increases in the 
wheat support price have frequently been blamed for increasing inflation 
(Government of Pakistan, Various Issues). 
Since 1970s controlling inflation has been a top priority for policy 
makers all over the world. Despite a long and unsettled theoretical debate 
regarding the causes of inflation it is consensus among economists and 
policy makers that maintaining price stability is the prime objective of 
monetary policy (King, 1999 and Blejer, et al., 2000). The monetary 
policy is conducted by the central bank. Therefore, maintaining price 
stability is the responsibility of a central bank and it is accountable for not 
achieving stable prices (Goodfriend, 2000, King, 1999, and Blejer and 
Leon, 2000). Like other central banks of the world State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) is also explicitly mandated to ensure price stability. It is established 
that the State Bank of Pakistan is fully capable of implementing its own 
independent monetary policy consistent with the needs of the domestic 
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economy and be forward-looking to achieve its inflation target (Khan and 
Schimmelpfennig, 2006). 
The recent rise of inflation in Pakistan has once again triggered a 
debate on the causes of inflation similar to the debate that took place 
during nineties (see for example Khan and Qasim, 1996). Even policy-
makers are divided on the issues of causes of inflation. Policymakers on 
one side have contended that the current inflation was caused by cost push 
factors such as wheat procurement price and oil price increases (GOP 
2005, 2006) and on the other side it is argued that accommodative 
monetary policy is responsible for current surge in inflation (Akhtar, 
2006). Further it is pointed out that monetary overhang is a cause of 
inflation  (SBP, 2007 and Sherani, 2005). It is not surprising that 
policymakers are pointing to the factors beyond their control as the cause 
of inflation and commentators are pointing to a policy failure and the 
inability of SBP to control money supply growth. The main objective of 
this study is to assess the efforts of SBP to control inflation in Pakistan.   
Next section discussed salient features of monetary policy in 
Pakistan including objectives, monetary targets and instruments. Section 3 
contains results and discussion and final section concludes the study. 
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2. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE MONETARY POLICY  
State Bank of Pakistan was established with two broad objectives; 
to secure monetary stability and to find fuller utilisation of country’s 
productive resources. These objectives are confined under the head of 
‘Functions and Responsibilities of the Central Board’ by making it 
responsible to secure monetary stability and soundness of the financial 
system. The Act 1956 of the State Bank of Pakistan (amended) states that 
‘the target rates of growth and inflation set by the Federal Government are 
the targets of monetary policy’. Therefore target rate of inflation is the 
prime objective of monetary policy in Pakistan. 
Monetary policy management is one of the primary goals of the 
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). In Pakistan the monetary policy has been 
supportive of the dual objectives; promoting economic growth and price 
stability. However, during the period from 2001 to 2005 monetary policy 
in Pakistan was biased towards supporting growth because of expectations 
that inflation could be maintained at low levels while giving the economy 
a monetary stimulus. Inflation started accelerating in 2005 that forced a 
reversal of monetary policy (SBP-MPS, 2006).  
The SBP is claiming to maintain tight monetary policy to deal with 
inflation particularly core inflation since September 2004 (SBP Annual 
Report, 2006-07). Further it is claimed that monetary policy has had a 
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visible impact on core inflation during FY06 and FY07. However, at the 
end of financial year 2007 core inflation started increasing. The stated 
reason is reserve money growth and supply management problem.  
It is observed that the tight monetary policy stance, has begun to 
lose some of its steam as manifested by a moderate increase in KIBOR 
and banks’ lending rates, almost flat Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), a 
fall in the effective CRR, and persistently high annualized M2 growth rate. 
First we discuss the situation of state of inflation, which is prime 
objective of monetary policy in Pakistan, during the period from 1991 to 
2008. The target and actual rate of inflation is given in Table 1 and 
percentage deviation of actual rate of inflation from the targeted rate of 
inflation is presented in the Figure 1. As can be seen from the table, from 
1991 to 1997 the actual rate of inflation remained above the target level. 
After 1997 till 2003 the actual rate of inflation in Pakistan remained below 
the target level implies it was under the control of authorities. It started 
rising from 2004 and remained above the target level except one year that 
is 2006 when it was exactly equal to the target rate. At the end of the 
financial year 2007-08 actual inflation substantially (100% higher) 
surpassed the target level of inflation set by the federal government..     
Abdul Qayyum 
 6 
In order to achieve the objectives of monetary policy the SBP 
targets monetary aggregate (M2) in accordance with the targets of real 
GDP growth and inflation set by the Government.  
Table 1: Targeted and Actual Rate of Inflation 
Years Actual  Target  
1990-91 12.7 13.0 
1991-92 10.6 7.0 
1992-93 9.8 9.5 
1993-94 11.2 7.0 
1994-95 13.0 7.0 
1995-96 10.8 9.5 
1996-97 11.8 8.5 
1997-98 7.8 9.0 
1998-1999 5.7 8.0 
1999-2000 3.6 8.0 
2000-2001 4.4 4.5 
2001-2002 3.5 5.5 
2002-2003 3.3 4.0 
2003-2004 4.6  
2004-2005 9.3 5.0 
2005-2006 7.9 8.0 
2006-2007 7.8 6.5 
2007-2008 17.5 6.5 
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Figure: 1     Percentage Deviation of Actual from Targeted Inflation
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2.2. M2 Growth as a Monetary Target -  
In order to control inflation one of the important and crucial 
intermediate target variables of monetary policy in Pakistan is money 
supply. Private sector credit growth and broad money (M2) growth are 
leading indicators of inflation in Pakistan (Khan and Schimmelpfennig, 
2006). It has already established thatexcess money supply growth causes 
inflation in Pakistan (Qayyum, 2006). Therefore, the SBP has been using 
M2 aggregate (i.e., currency + demand deposits + time deposits) as an 
intermediate target to control inflation (Akhtar, 2006). The selection of 
M2 as a policy variable is based on the assumption that the demand for 
M2 function is stable in Pakistan and it has strong association with the rate 
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of inflation. The stability of M2 demand function has been established in a 
number of studies such as Qayyum (2006), among others. The money 
growth and rate of inflation have positive relationship having coefficient 
of correlation as 0.27. Further money growth and next year’s rate of 
inflation also have positive relationship as is indicated by the cross 
correlations coefficient (i.e., 0.44). Moreover excess money growth 
positively affects the future rate of inflation with coefficient of cross 
correlation as 0.42. 
  By using the estimated money demand function the SBP set the 
target rate of growth of M2. Fisher’s equation of exchange has been used 
by the SBP to calculate the growth target for M2. It assumes that there is 
one to one relationship between prices and money supply in Pakistan. The 
change in M2 can be decomposed as change in Y and change in P 
assuming constant velocity.  
According to the law and practice target rate of growth and target 
rate of inflation are fixed by the Federal Government. The SBP just 
combine those targets and obtain target rate of growth of money supply. 
During calculation of target value it is implicitly assumed that the velocity 
of circulation money in Pakistan is constant. However resent studies found 
that the velocity of circulation of money in Pakistan is not constant it is 
showing decreasing trend since 1973 (Qayyum, 2006). This decline in 
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velocity is due to the structural changes in the financial sector of Pakistan 
that induced the process of monetization and expansion of commercial 
banking during last two decades. This declining nature of velocity of money 
implies that formulation of monetary policy must consider development in 
the real and financial sectors and treat them as constraints on the policy. 
Further it costs doubt on the working of appropriateness of value of target 
rate of money growth to combat inflation.  For example if the target rate of 
growth and inflation are fixed by the Federal Government as 8% and 5% 
respectively, then target rate of growth in M2 worket out to be 13%. If 
there is decline in velocity by 2% than targe rate of M2 growth would 
have been 15% rather than 13%. 
Actual M2 growth and targeted M2 growth during for the period 
from 1991 to 2007 are presented in Table 2. As can be seen from the 
Table, after 2001 actual M2 growth remained higher than the target rate of 
money growth set by the SBP to control inflation. It implies that either the 
SBP failed control growth of money supply or following loose monetary 
policy during this period. However the SBP claims that it is pursuing tight 
monetary policy since 2004 and empirical evidences contradicts the claim. 
The money supply growth at first round affects real GDP growth and at 
second round it affects inflation. In Pakistan growth in M2 affects rate of 
inflation after one year (Qayyum, 2006). Positive deviation of money 
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growth from target level is indicative that inflation is going to rise in 
future. Business sector in Pakistan was expecting a rise in inflation (PIDE, 
2007) along with the speeches of the then governor of SBP.  
 
Table No. 2 
Targeted and Actual M2 Growth in Pakistan 
 Target Actual 
Years Target Growth Actual Growth 
1990-91 34.2 10.80 59.39 17.4 
1991-92 48.2 12.90 104.93 26.2 
1992-93     
1993-94 79.4 14.03 108.01 18.1 
1994-95 76.3 11.51 121.24 17.2 
1995-96 100.5 13.00 113.94 13.8 
1996-97 116.0 12.36 114.60 12.2 
1997-98 150.0 14.24 153.09 14.5 
1998-99 164.0 13.64 74.22 6.2 
1999-00 121.0 09.44 120.99 9.4 
2000-01 147.0 10.50 126.03 9.0 
2001-02 146.0 09.50 235.33 15.4 
2002-03 190.0 10.80 219.87 12.5 
2003-04 230.0 11.10 317.40 12.3 
2004-05 280.0 11.30 745.2 19.3 
2005-06 380.0 12.8 446.3 15.2 
2006-07 459.9 13.5 659.9 19.3 
2007-08  13.7  15.2 
 
2.3 Instruments of Monetary Policy 
Last two decades witnessed a number of changes in the monetary 
sector of Pakistan. In the beginning of 1980s monetary authorities in 
Pakistan has decided to abandon the fixed exchange rate mechanism and 
adopted floating exchange rate system. This step supposed to have 
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activated another important channel of monetary transmission mechanism 
in Pakistan. Further in late 1980s the authorities has started working on 
comprehensive financial sector reforms with the help of international 
financial agencies such as International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
(Ahmed, 2006 and Khan and Khan, 2007). During these reforms a number 
of steps have been taken to modernise monetary sector. On this road 
monetary authorities have taken steps to utilise the market based 
instruments of monetary policy in Pakistan.  
After the start of financial sector reforms Open Market Operation 
(OMO) has become an important instrument of monetary policy in 
Pakistan. The SBP can influence/manage domestic liquidity through 
purchase or sale of government securities in the secondary market. The 
OMO can also be used to maintain the level of reserve money according to 
the operating target. Other instruments are discussed in the next sections. 
2.3.1 Cash Reserve Requirement 
Cash Reserve Requirement is another instrument of monetary 
policy being used by the SBP in Pakistan. The SBP imposes cash reserve 
requirement on all deposits of scheduled banks as an instrument of 
monetary policy. Currently weekly reserve requirement of every Bank is 
fixed as 9 percent of average weekly deposits. However, under another 
condition the amount of these reserves should not be less than 4 percent of 
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daily deposits. Apart from the reserve requirement every Bank has to 
maintain 15 percent of total daily deposits as a liquidity requirement. For 
this purpose liquidity includes cash, gold and government securities. 
Movement of CRR during last two decades is presented in the Table 3.    
Now it reached at highest level in the last two decades. 
Table No. 3 
CASH RESERVE REQUIREMENT 
No Effective From Percentage of Demand and Time 
Liabilities 
  Minimum   Weekly Average 
1 01-01-1991 - 5.0 
2 28-07-1997 4.0 5.0 
3 22-06-1998 - 3.75 
4 05-09-1998 4.0 5.0 
5 19-05-1999 2.5 3.5 
6 12-07-1999 4.0 5.0 
7 07-10-2000 6.0 7.0 
8 16-12-2000 4.0 5.0 
9 30-12-2001 3.0 5.0 
10 06-01-2001 4.0 5.0 
 23-05.2008 9.00  
 
2.3.2 Discount Rate 
Current Monetary Policy seeks to check rising inflation through 
change in discount rate and CRR. The assumption is that the two changes 
would cut down money supply and therefore inflation. The transmission 
mechanism i.e. link among interest rate, money supply and inflationis not 
completely understood or at least has not been made explicit by SBP. It 
appears that complete understanding of issues like state of effectiveness of 
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different channels, Lag structure of monetary policy changes, magnitude 
of pass-through of policy changes to inflation and output and nature of 
relationship amongst, instruments and goals of monetary policy (inflation 
and output) is lacking. 
Movement in interest rate has been presented in the Table 4. As 
can be seen from the Table, the interest rate was at the peak level of 14% 
on April 03, 1999 and June 07, 2001. Then it started to decline and 
reached at the lowest level of 7.5% on November 18, 2002. It remained at 
lowest level until April 11, 2005. This implies that during this period SBP 
was following very loose monetary policy. Now it has reached at 12 % 
level on May 21, 2008. 
Table 4: Discount Rate 
 Date Change (Basis Points) Rate 
1. April 03, 99  14.0 
2. May 19, 99 -100 13.0 
3. January 05, 00 -100 11.0 
4. September 19, 00 100 12.0 
5. October 05, 00 100 13.0 
6. June 07, 01 100 14.0 
7. July 19, 01 -100 13.0 
8. August 17, 01 -100 12.0 
9. October 20, 01 -200 10.0 
10 January 23, 02 -100 9.0 
11 November 18, 02 -150 7.5 
12 April 11, 2005 150 9.00 
13 July 22, 2006 50 9.50 
14 August 01, 2007 50 10.00 
15 January 31, 2008 50 10.5 
16 May 21, 2008 150 12.00 
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The monetary tightening seems to lay major emphasis upon the 
interest rate channel. This brings to fore the question of effectiveness of 
the interest rate channel of the transmission mechanism. From the 
Monetary Policy Statement it is not clear whether the issues of lags and 
the magnitude of pass-through of changes in policy rate to inflation have 
been investigated at the SBP level or that independent studies on the 
subject have been accounted for.  
It is interesting to note that during recent period interest rate and 
money growth are negatively correlated that is -0.71. Interest rate also 
significantly affects current and future rate of inflation as correlation 
coefficient between the two are -0.36 and -0.45 respectively. In this 
regard, studies show that interest rate influences inflation with a lag of 12 
to 18 months (Kemal, 2006) and the magnitude of impact is very small 
(Khan and Qayyum, 2007, Qayyum, Khan and Khawaja, 2007). However, 
Khan (2007) shows that the relationship between interest rate and inflation 
is positive. If the demand for goods and services does not increase, the 
firms may pass on the increase in financial cost to the consumers thereby 
raising inflation.  
Increase in interest rate will affect demand for credit to the 
business sector. The transmission mechanism is that it effect money 
market rate, saving rate and lending rate. Studies found that it takes 12 to 
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18 month to effect lending rates and upto two years to affect saving rates 
in Pakistan. It implies that this will affect first lending rate than the deposit 
rates. Through this channel demand for credit by the private business 
sector would decrease. Evidences indicate that demand for credit by the 
private business sector is not much affected by the movement in the 
interest rate. Therefore, movement in interest rate would be ineffective to 
control money supply. 
The SBP seems to have based its money growth and hence the 
stance of monetary policy, keeping in view the growth target fixed by the 
government. The question arises what happens to money growth if the 
actual output growth is less than the targeted level? 
The increase in interest rate would increase interest payments on 
government debt thereby increasing fiscal deficit. Given that the 
government had been borrowing, beyond the agreed level, from the SBP 
and that the SBP has not been able to restrain the government from doing 
so, the likelihood is that government would finance the higher deficit on 
account of higher interest payment by borrowing further from the central 
bank. Thus a part of the decline in monetary growth due to higher interest 
payments might be offset.  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is written with the aim of getting a clear understanding 
of Monetary Policy Framework and its effectiveness to control inflation in 
Pakistan. In this regard, we presented the salient features of current 
Monetary Policy. We have come up with the following findings. 
The monetary authority was successful in controlling inflation 
when it successfully controlled the money supply target. The calculation 
of money supply target needs to be improved to get appropriate target 
level of M2. It is also concluded that in the recent years SBP failed to to 
control money supply and hence rate of inflation within the set target 
level.  
There seems to be a lack of coordination between Fiscal and 
Monetary Authorities. The Reaction Functions of Monetary Policy seems 
to be inconsistent overtime. The understanding of issues regarding 
monetary policy transmission mechanism like state of effectiveness of 
different channels, lag structure of monetary policy changes, magnitude of 
pass-through of policy changes to inflation and output and nature of 
relationship amongst, instruments and goals of monetary policy (inflation 
and output) seems to be lacking and need fresh investigation.  
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